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13973 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action to 
determine the relationship between the 
Utah No Fault Act and the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act and to determine the 
i-"U--^ n ^ - , 1 ^ r»,-,1r-; v» rye -r-\ r~\x .1/-^ •v /~\ -F 4- V» e. 
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Commissioner of Insurance. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the 
Court without a jury who found that 
the No Fault Act has no application 
to employees injured while in the 
course and scope of their employment 
who are covered by Workmen's Compen-
sation; that an employee's exclusive 
remedy against his employer for 
damages resulting from injuries 
sustained in the course of his 
employment is limited to benefits 
provided by the Utah Workmen's Comp-
ensation Act; and that the Utah No 
Fault Act cannot be made applicable 
to accidents which occur outside the 
boundaries of the State of Utah by 
regulation of the State Insurance 
Commissioner. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal 
of the judgment of the trial court and a 
judgment determining (1) that Plaintiffs 
failed to exhaust their administrative 
remedies before bringing this action in 
the court, (2) that Plaintiffs must comply 
with the Utah No Fault Act without regard 
to the benefits provided employees under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act and 
(3) that the Commissioner by regulation ca: 
make applicable the No Fault Act to acci-
dents which occur outside the boundaries 
of the State of-Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1917, the State of Utah adopted a 
Workmen's Compensation Act which provides 
special protection for employees injured 
on the job and that the act be the exclu-
sive remedy of an employee against his 
employer. (Chapter I Title 35, UCA). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Effective January 1, 1974, the State of 
Utah adopted a No Fault Insurance Act 
which provides that every resident owner 
of a motor vehicle in the State of Utah 
must maintain minimum insurance protec-
tion to occupants of insured motor 
vehicles or pedestrians struck by such 
vehicles regardless of fault and coor-
dinates the insurance benefits under 
the No Fault Act and the Workmen's 
Compensation Act* (Chapter 41, Title 31, 
UCA) . 
On October 1, 1973, the Insurance 
Commissioner adopted Regulation 73-1 
which provides for the identification 
of "Employer's Fleets:r such as those 
owned by Plaintiffs herein for coverage 
under the No Fault Act and otherwise 
construes the act to be applicable to 
Plaintiffs herein. (Exhibit D-l). 
Prior to adoption of the regulation and 
after due notice, a hearing was held Digitized by the Howard W. Hu ter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
regarding the regulation. The Insurance 
Commissioner found the coordination of 
benefits provision between the No 
Fault and the Workmen's Compensation Act 
reduced the charge of the No Fault pre-
mium 10% under the applicable industrial 
manual. (T.27,28). Plaintiff makes 
no claim that he appeared at the public 
hearing or made any objection thereto. 
In February of 1974, the Insurance 
Commissioner adopted and issued his 
No Fault Bulletin requiring an extension 
of No Fault coverage so as to include 
out-of-state accidents by motor 
vehicles otherwise required to carry 
No Fault Insurance under the act. There 
were two reasons for the adoption of 
the February bulletin. Prior to the 
No Fault Act, many policy holders in 
the State of Utah had purchased medical 
coverage which covered their accidents 
whether within the State of Utah or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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without the State. The adoption of 
No Fault with its required medical 
coverage meant such medical duplication 
policies were no longer necessary. 
The major independent companies in the 
State extended the No Fault coverage 
to include out-of-state accidents 
without additional premium. The rest 
of the companies extended the coverage 
to include out-of-state accidents on a 
family policy for a premium of $2.00 
per year. (T.24,2 5,2 6,27). 
Plaintiff makes no claim that he 
objected to the adoption or promulgation 
of the bulletin. 
The Plaintiffs in this case are 
interstate carriers who are resident 
owners of motor vehicles in this state 
and employ drivers who have had accidents 
in Utah and surrounding states for 
which benefits have been claimed by 
their employees against the Plaintiffs 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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under the Utah No Fault Act (T.5,6). 
Plaintiffs make no claim that they 
requested a hearing on their complaint 
against and differences with the Insur-
ance Commissioner nor do they claim 
such hearing has been held before the 
Commissioner and that the Commissioner 
has made findings in this regard. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING 
THE PLAINTIFFS TO EXHAUST THEIR ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKING RELIEF 
FROM THE COURT/ 
This issue presents an important 
question of law for decision. In a 
case where a Plaintiff is aggrieved by 
a ruling or regulation adopted by a 
State Administrative Agency, and there 
exists by statute a procedure whereby 
persons aggrieved by such ruling may 
have a hearing before the agency for 
the purpose of correction of any mistakes 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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or errors caused by the ruling of the 
agency, and to allow the agency to 
review the application of the ruling 
or regulation for the purpose of 
correcting the errors or remedying 
any injustice caused by such action 
of the agency, must the person aggrieved 
avail himself of the administrative 
relief available to him prior to 
seeking relief from the courts? 
Plaintiffs filed this action 
against the Utah Commissioner of 
Insurance alleging that the Commissioner 
adopted regulations under the No Fault 
Act set out above and otherwise construed 
the Act so as to require Plaintiffs 
trucking lines, operating fleets of 
vehicles within the State of Utah, 
to insure under the Utah No Fault Act 
and that the Commissioner promulgated 
the ruling set out above requiring Utah 
Motor Carriers to obtain out-of-state Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
endorsements on their No Fault insur-
ance which ruling the Plaintiffs claim 
should be struck down by the court. 
It is these acts of the State Insurance 
Commissioner by which Plaintiffs claim 
they are aggrieved . The Utah Insurance 
Code provides: 
"31-4-1. The Commissioner may hold 
a hearing for any purpose he 
deems proper under this code. He 
shall hold a hearing: 
1. If required by any provision 
of this code, or, 
2. Upon written demand for a hear-
ing made by any person aggrieved 
by any act or threatened act or 
failure of the Commissioner to act, 
if such failure is deemed an act 
under any provision of this code, 
or by any report, promulgation or 
order of the Commissioner. 
This administrative remedy is mandatory 
upon the Commissioner in all cases where 
persons are aggrieved by acts of the 
Commissioner and make demand therefor. 
If the proper administrative remedy 
is followed, the court will benefit 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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from the expertise of the Commissioner 
on this very dispute, a record will 
have been made for appeal to the District 
Court in accordance with the statute, 
and the Commissioner will be allowed the 
opportunity to correct any mistake he 
may have made prior to requiring the 
courts to adjudicate the matter. If 
the Plaintiffs after the hearing still 
feel aggrieved, our Insurance Code is 
explicit in providing the manner in 
which an appeal should be taken from the 
order of the Commissioner and the action 
of the District Court upon hearing the 
appeal: 
"31-3-10. Manner of Taking Appeal -
The appeal shall be taken by filing 
with the clerk of the District 
Court for Salt Lake County a peti-
tion for a review of the order or 
decision of the Commissioner 
containing a copy of the order or 
decision, and a statement of the 
particulars in which it is claimed 
that the order is in error and a 
statement of the relief prayed for, 
and by serving a copy of the petition 
certified by the clerk of court, 
upon the Commissioner." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"31-4-12 Hearing and determination 
of appeal - Judgment on appeal -
costs. - The court shall give 
precedence to and shall promptly 
hear and determine the appeal. 
The court shall hear the appeal 
upon the transcript of the record 
of the commission's hearing and 
on such additional proper evidence 
as may be offered by any party. 
After considering the evidence 
the court may affirm, modify, or 
set aside the order appealed from. 
Costs shall be awarded as in civil 
cases." 
"The doctrine of exhaustion of 
administration remedies requires 
that where a remedy before an 
administrative agency is provided, 
relief must be sought by exhausting 
this remedy before the courts will 
act. This doctrine is well estab-
lished, is a cardinal principle of 
practically universal application 
and must be borne in mind by the 
courts in construing a statute 
providing for review of adminis-
trative action." 2 AmJur 2nd 
Administrative Law §595 and cases 
cited .therein. 
The rule is universally applied 
and has been accepted by this honorable 
court. See Walker Bank & Trust Company, 
15 U.2d 234,.390 P.2d 592 (1964); 
Pacific Intermountain Express v State 
Tax Commission, 7 U.2d 15, 316 P.2d 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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549 (1957) . 
In the Pacific Intermountain 
Express case, supra, this Court stated: 
"...Before one may seek a review 
of the action of an administrative 
body, he must exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies and thereby give 
the agency an opportunity to 
correct any error it may have 
made." 8 U.2d at 19. 
The same general rule is outlined 
in the Walker Bank case supra, wherein 
this Court states that as a general rule 
exhaustion of administrative remedies 
must be had before a case can be brought 
before the Courts. While in the Walker 
Bank case, supra, the Court did not 
require exhaustion in the classic sense, 
it did state with approval the general 
rule as stated in the P.I. E, case, 
supra, and then held that it was not 
requiring administrative exhaustion in 
the present case because the acts 
complained of were clearly outside the 
statutory authority of the administrator. 
... . - 1 2 - • " • • ' • • ' ' 
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This exception is in complete harmony 
with the general law requiring exhaus-
tion of remedies. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING 
THAT THE LATER ADOPTED PROVISIONS OF 
THE UTAH NO FAULT ACT TAKE PRECEDENCE 
OVER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT 
TO THE EXTENT OF THE CONFLICT. 
The applicable section of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act provides as 
follows: 
"35-1-60. The right to recover 
compensation pursuant to the pro-
visions of this title for injuries 
sustained by an employee, whether 
resulting in death or not, shall 
be the exclusive remedy against 
any officer, agent or employee of 
the employer and the liabilities 
of the employer imposed by this 
act shall be in place of any and 
all other civil liability whatso-
ever, at common law or otherwise, 
to such employee or to his spouse, 
widow, children, parents, depen-
dents, next of kin, heirs, personal 
representatives, guardian, or any 
other person whomsoever, on account 
of any accident or injury or 
death, in any way contracted, 
sustained, aggravated or incurred 
by such employee in the course of 
or because of or arising out of 
his employment, and no action at Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
law may be maintained against an 
employer or against any officer, 
agent or employee of the employer 
based upon any accident, injury 
or death of an employee..." 
The pertinent provisions of the later 
adopted No Fault Act read as follows: 
"31-41-7(1) Every resident owner 
of a motor vehicle shall maintain 
the security provided for in 
Section 31-41-5 in effect contin-
uously throughout the registration 
period of the motor vehicle.!i 
31-41-7 Personal Injuries covered-
Primary coverage - reduction of 
benefits. - (1) The coverages 
described in section 31-41-6 
shall be applicable to: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained 
by the insured when injured in 
an accident in this state invol-
ving any motor vehicle. 
(b) Personal injuries arising 
out of automobile accidents 
occurring in this state sustained 
by any other natural person while 
occupying the described motor 
vehicle with the consent of the 
insured or while a pedestrian if 
injured in an accident involving 
the described motor vehicle. 
(2) When.a person injured is also 
an insured party under any other 
policy, including those complying 
with this act, primary coverage 
shall be afforded by the policy Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
insuring the motor vehicle out 
of the use of which the accident 
arose. 
(3) The benefits payable to any 
injured person under Section 
31-41-6 shall be reduced by: 
(a) Any benefits which that person 
receives or is entitled to receive 
as a result of an accident covered 
in this act under any Workmen's 
Compensation plan or any similar 
statutory plan; and 
•(b) Any amounts which that person 
receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of 
its agencies because of military 
enlistment, duty or service. " 
"In interpretation of statutes, the 
legislative will is the all 
important or controlling factor... 
Accordingly, the primary rule of 
construction of statutes is to 
ascertain and declare the intention 
of the legislature...All rules 
for the interpretation of statutes... 
have for their sole object the 
discovery of the legislative 
intent..." 73 AmJur 2nd Statutes 
§146. 
• It is submitted the following 
factors tend to disclose the legislative 
intent in enacting the No Fault Act. 
A^ No Fault by JLts terms is inclusi1 
The operative section above cited 
. - i •=;-. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
provides that every resident owner of 
a motor vehicle shall maintain the 
required security. The statute does 
not exclude those, who are also required 
to provide the coverages under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act as is the 
claim of the Plaintiff in this case. 
The general rule of statutory construc-
tion is that where a statute is clear 
and unambiguous on its face, it need 
not and cannot be interpreted by a 
court. 2A Sands, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction,, §45.02 (4th Ed. 1973), 
See Jay v Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); 
Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949). 
in the case of Cammenetti v U.S., 2 42 
U.S. 470, (1916), the Supreme Court of 
the United States discussed the question 
of statutory interpretation and con-
struction. It stated: 
"Where the language is plain and 
admits of no more than one 
meaning, the duty of interpretation 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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does not arise and the rules which 
are to aid doubtful meanings need 
no discussion.1' Id at 485. 
The court went on to state: 
"It is elementary that the meaning 
of a statute must in the first 
instance be thought in the language 
within which the act is framed, 
and if this is plain...the sole 
function of the courts is to 
enforce it according to its terms." 
Id. 
The court further stated: 
"Statutory words are uniformly 
presumed, unless the contrary 
appears, to be used in their 
ordinary and usual sense and with 
the meaning commonly attributed 
to them." Id at 4 85-86. 
B. No Fault Coordinates Benefits 
with Workmen's Compensation. Under 
Section 7 of the No Fault Act quoted 
above, the Legislature expressed its 
intention to coordinate the benefits 
between the No Fault Act and the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. If an 
insured is entitled to receive compen-
sation under Workmenr s Compensation his 
No Fault benefits will be reduced Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accordingly. Although it does not appear 
that the Legislature thought the problem 
through to its conclusion, it does 
appear that the Legislature considered 
the fact that benefits were provided 
under both Workmen1s Compensation and 
No Fault and the Legislature set forth 
how those benefits were to be coordinated. 
Professor Robert E. Keeton of Harvard 
Law School has suggested a proposition 
that might be used by the court in making 
a determination of statutory construc-
tion. His first proposition is as 
follows: 
"Apply the mandate of the statute 
if it appears that the Legislature 
did in fact both consider and 
prescribe for the problem at hand." 
Keeton, Venturing to do Justice, 
at pages 94-95, (Harvard University 
Press, 1969), see Sands, supra at 
§45.09 page 30. 
C. No Fault was enacted later 
than Workmen's Compensation. One of the 
rules of statutory construction is that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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if there is an irreconcilable conflict 
between the new provision and the 
prior statutes relating to the same 
subject matter, the new provision will 
control as it is the latter expression 
of the Legislature. See e.g. Roberts 
v Tise, 198 Ark, 397, 129 S.W. 2d 258, 
262 (1939); City of Flat River v 
Mackley, 212 S.W. 2d 462,466 (Mo. App. 
1948); City of Dallas v Brown, 380 
S.W. 2d 833,837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); 
State v Varney, 142 W.Va. 105, 96 
S.E.2d 72 (1957); May v Warnick, 227 
Myd. 77, 175 A.2d 413 (1961). In 
the City of Flat River case there 
existed on the statutes of Missouri, 
what was called the "Sunday" law 
which prohibited the sale of intoxi-
cating beverages on Sunday. A later 
legislature adopted an act relating 
to the sale of what was by statute 
defined as non-intoxicating beer v/hich Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
provided that said substance could be 
sold on Sunday. In a challenge to the 
right to sell beer on Sunday, the 
Missouri Courts stated: 
"Section 4742, the "Sunday11 law, 
and Section 4950, the "Non-
intoxicating Beer" law, both being 
State laws and Section 4950 
being the latter law by the Legis-
lature upon the subject of the sale 
of fermented liquor (beer) the 
conclusion is inescapable that the 
Legislature intended to modify the 
"Sunday" lav;. 
...This conclusion is in accord 
with the decision of our Supreme 
Court wherein it has been held 
that although two statutes relating 
to the same general subject matter 
should be read together and har-
monized if possible, with a view 
to giving effect to a consistent 
legislative policy, nevertheless 
to the extent that statutes are 
inconsistent, the latter statute 
which deals with the same in a 
particular way will prevail over 
an earlier statute of a more 
general nature and the latter 
statute will be regarded as an 
exception to or qualification of 
the earlier general statute." 
212 S.W. 2d at 466. 
I n
 S^ate v Varney, supra., the West 
Virginia Supreme Court states: 
n n_. 
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11
 If the several statutory provisions 
cannot be harmonized, controlling 
effect must be given to the last 
enactment of the Legislature . 
and where tv?r> distinct statutes 
stand in pari materia and the 
sections thereof are in irrecon-
cilable conflict, that section 
must prevail which can properly 
be considered as the last expression 
of the law-making power." 96 S.E. 
2d at 72. See Sands, supra, at 
§41.02. 
D. Workmen's Compensation is not 
an Exclusive Remedy in spite of its 
terms. By its terms the Workmen's 
Compensation Statute would seem to make 
absolute the fact that Workmen1s 
Compensation is the only remedy an 
employee has against his employer for 
injuries sustained by an employee in 
the scope of his employment. This of 
course is not the case. An employee 
who falls within the purview of one 
of the federal acts such as the 
Federal Employer's Liability Act, or 
the Federal Longshoreman's and Harbor 
Workers Compensation Act is allowed to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proceed under those acts and completely 
ignore the absolute terms of the Act. 
58 Am Jur Workmen's Compensation §76, 
Utah Idaho Central Railway Co, v The 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 84 Ut. 
364, 35 P.2d 842. 
E. Trial Courtfs ruling may be 
discriminatory. The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
provides a guarantee of equal protection 
of the law, requiring that all persons 
shall be treated alike under like cir-
cumstances and conditions both in the 
privileges conferred and the liabilities 
imposed and that the classification 
made by the Legislature must be reasonable 
16 AmJur 2d Constitutional Law §485 
et seq. The natural construction of 
the No Fault Act as proposed by the 
Appellant herein requires every resident 
owner of a motor vehicle to be treated 
similarly. Under this construction 
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the total benefits to all such insured 
parties will be similar when the Work-
men'1 s Compensation benefits are coordi-
nated with the No Fault Act as provided. 
Under the strained construction 
proposed by the Plaintiffs, those who 
are allowed the benefits under the 
Workmen!s Compensation Act are forbidden 
the benefits provided under Wo Fault 
even though these persons fit precisely 
in the classification established by 
the Legislature for the receipt of No 
Fault benefits. This problem of dis-
crimination is not raised under the 
interpretation proposed by Appellant. 
Under the interpretation proposed by 
Appellant, all of those who fall in the 
category fixed by the Legislature for 
receiving Workmen's Compensation 
benefits will receive the Workmen*s 
Compensation benefits provided under 
the statute. Those who additionally Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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fall within the category as recipients 
of benefits provided by the No Fault 
Act,' will additionally receive the 
benefits provided under the No Fault 
Act. This constitutional challenge to 
the No Fault Act is thereby avoided. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING 
THAT THE COMMISSIONER COULD ADOPT 
SUPPLEMENTAL REGULATIONS TO THE NO 
FAULT ACT WHEN NOT IN CONFLICT WITH 
THE TERMS OF THE ACT. 
The No Fault Act provides: 
•."31-41"-7 Personal Injuries 
covered - Primary coverage -
Reduction of benefits. - (1) The 
coverages described in Section 
31-41-6 shall be applicable to: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained 
by the insured when injured in an 
accident in this state involving 
any motor~vehicTe7 
(b) Personal injuries arising out 
of automobile accidents occurring 
in this state sustained by any 
other natural person while occupy-
ing the desci'ibed motor vehicle 
with the consent of the insured 
or while a pedestrian if injured 
in an accident involving the 
described motor vehicle." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"31-41-5(2) Nothing contained in 
this act shall be construed to 
prohibit the issuance of policies 
of insurance providing coverage 
greater than the minimura coverages 
required under this act nor to 
require the segregation of such 
minimum coverages from other 
coverages in the same policy.'1 
"31-41-12 The department is authori-
zed to promulgate such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary 
for the purposes of this act." 
The Insurance Commission promul-
gated its bulletin in February of 1974 
which states: 
"To those automobile insurance 
companies that have not extended 
coverage against injury resulting 
from accidents that happen outside 
the state of Utah, it will be 
required that the out-of-state 
extension endorsement of P.I.P. 
coverages be included as part of 
their No Fault coverage." 
The authority granting the Commis-
sioner authority to make rules and 
regulations is found in Section 
31-2-3.5: 
11
 (1) The Commissioner may make 
reasonable rules and regulations 
necessary for, or as an aid to,. 
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of this code. No such rule or 
regulation or regulations shall 
conflict with any law of this 
State or the reasonable implica-
tions thereof." 
The question to be determined then 
is whether or not the bulletin adopted 
by the Commissioner "conflicts" with the 
passage of the No Fault Act quoted 
above. It may be helpful to refer to 
the meaning of the term "conflict" in 
the context in which it is used in the 
statute by referring to Webster's 
Unabridged Dictionary, (2nd Edition 
1953) : 
"1. A strife for the mastery; 
hostile encounter, a fight; 
a battle, especially a prolonged 
conflict; struggle. 
2. Competition or opposing action 
of incompatibles; antagonism as 
of divergent interests, ideas, 
or acts. 
3.. A striking or dashing together; 
collision, crash. 
4. Psychological presence of 
opposing desires or tendencies." 
The provision allowing the 
Commissioner to make rules and regula-
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tions which do not "conflict" with 
state laws is the same type of pro-
vision which allows municipalities to 
adopt ordinances v/hich do not "conflict" 
with state statutes. In making the 
determination as to whether or not a 
city ordinance conflicts with a state 
statute, the Ohio Supreme Court in the 
case of Village of Struthers v Sokol, 
108 Ohio State 263, 140 N.E. 519,521 
(1923) held that in determining whether 
an ordinance is in "conflict" with 
general laws, the test is whether the 
ordinance permits or licenses that 
which the statute forbids and prohibits 
and vice versa. The exact language 
of the court in this respect is as 
follows: 
"It is manifest that this branch 
of the case must turn largely 
upon the range of meaning to be 
given the word "conflict" and 
whether differences, where no 
antagonism appears will render 
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the ordinances invalid. The 
century dictionary has defined 
''conflict" as follows: 
'Discord of action/ feeling or 
effect; antagonism as of interest 
or principles; counter-action 
as of causes, laws, or agencies 
of any kind; opposing action or 
tendencies, opposition, collision.* 
Measured by the foregoing defini-
tion, it is difficult to observe 
the real conflict. No real con-
flict can exist unless the 
ordinance declares something to 
be right which the state law 
declares to be wrong, or vice 
versa." 140 N.E. at 521 
Two later Ohio cases quote with 
approval the definitions of a conflicting 
ordinance as given in the Village of 
Struthers case, supra. See Otto v 
Whearty, 63 Ohio App. 495, 27 N.E. 
2d 190,192 (1940); State v Carran, 
133 Ohio State 50, 11 N.E. 2d 245,246 
(1937). It appears also that this 
method of determining whether or not a 
local ordinance conflicts with a state 
statute has been adopted by other courts 
as well. See e.g. Loewenberg v 
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Fidelity Union Casualty Company, 
147 So. 81-89-90 (La.App. 1933); 
People v Fages, 32 Cal. App. 37, 162 
Pac. 137,139 (1917). c.f. Woodruff 
v Centanne, 89 So. 2d 570. 
It is submitted the test of the 
cases then is to determine whether or 
not the regulation adopted by the 
Commissioner allows or requires some-
thing which is prohibited by the No 
Fault Act or in the alternative pro-
hibits something which is allowed 
under the Act. There is no provision 
in the No Fault Act which prohibits the 
Commissioner from adopting the regu-
lation in question and the act itself 
allows for additional coverage to be 
greater than that provided in the Act. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellants-Defendants respect-
fully submit that the Trial Court 
erred in the points detailed herein-
above and that this court should find 
1) that the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust 
their administrative remedies before 
bringing this action in the court, 
2) that the Plaintiffs must comply with 
the Utah No Fault Act without regard 
to the benefits provided employees 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act 
and 3) that the Commissioner by regu-
lation can make applicable the No Fault 
Act to accidents that occur outside the 
boundaries of the State of Utah. 
Dated thisoM[ day of March, 1975. 
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